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WEST IRGINIA LAW QUABTERLY
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
QUOTIENT VERDICTS - ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO PROVE SAME.-
A verdict should be the result of intelligent discussion, honest
deliberation and the expression of the ultimate conviction of the
jurors as to the rights of the parties under the law and evidence of
the case. Wherever it can be shown that the verdict was not so
found it must be set aside.' Some verdicts, invalid because not
predicated upon the above rule, are the chance verdict,2 certain
forms of compromise verdicts,1 and the quotient verdict. The
quotient verdict is the result of a prior agreement of all the jurors
that each shall mark down the amount to which he believes the
prevailing party is entitled, the amounts so indicated being added
together and the total divided by twelve, and the quotient there-
of accepted as the verdict.4  It is the prior agreement to accept
the quotient, so derived, that invalidates the verdict. Thus where
the process was purely tentative, and the quotient so determined,
the jury agreed to accept it as their verdict, the manner of the
finding was held to be immaterial.5 The distinction may at first
seem to be technical, but it will appear less so when it is considered
that absence of the agreement to adopt the quotient as the verdict
leaves the jury free further to discuss the fitness of the sum found
and even to change it. But in a case where there is no further dis-
cussion, would it not seem that the verdict is equally as bad as if
the agreement to be bound thereby had been made beforehand?
If in the latter case the verdict is declared invalid because the
party has been denied his right of having his damages based upon
the discussion and conscientious deliberation of the jury by reason
of the prior agreement to be bound by the quotient verdict, the
former is none the less obnoxious where the jury has arbitrarily
denied him the same right, though without resorting to the mere
formality of an agreement. The distinction, then, is one that may
or may not be justified, depending upon the caprice of the jury.
I Abbott's Civil Jury Trial, 4th ed. 844.
A Ottawa v. Gilliland, 63 Kan. 165, 65 Pac. 252, (1901).
Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563; 97 N. E. 102, (1912).
Wash. Park Co. v. Goodrich, 110 Va. 692; 66 S. E. 978. (1910).
Groves & S. R. R. Co. v. Herman, 206 11. 34, 69 N. E. 36, (1903).
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The rule declaring true quotient verdicts invalid assumes that
substantial justice will not be done by them. If that assumption is
disputed, the argument could only be somewhat as follows: Prac-
tically, resort will be had to the quotient verdict only after pro-
longed discussion where apparent failure to reach a verdict looms
ahead; that such a verdict will render more substantial justice
than would no verdict at all where a right to recover is conceded;
that each juror in setting down what he believes to be just will seek
to offset the sum assessed by others whose estimate is most strongly
antagonistic to his own, and thus an equitable and fair verdict will
be the outcome; therefore the end justifies the means. But it will
be seen at once that these arguments are utterly speculative,
possibly ascribing to the jury a sagacity and foresight they do
not merit. Speculation has no limits. Therefore, the conclusion
is that to get at the right we must resort to something more tangible
and accordingly turn to the salutary common law rule.
If, then, the rule is vindicated in theory, do the rules excluding
evidence offered to impeach this kind of verdict destroy its practi-
cability and render it useless if theoretically sound? The process
by which a quotient verdict is derived falls into that class of acts
to which is applied the term misconduct of the jury.6 It has long
been held that a juror cannot testify to impeach a verdict based
upon his own misconduct.' This rule excludes the affidavits of
jurors tendered to show that the verdict was found by the process
of averaging estimates." In California a statute which permitted
jurors to testify toward impeaching their verdict on grounds of
misconduct was construed to exclude all evidence of this nature
except that which showed the verdict to have been determined by
chance.9 Even in those states where the jury may be polled, it
was held error for the court to permit counsel to ask the jurors to
state in what manner they arrived at the amount of the damages
reported by them.'0 The finding of a piece or pieces of paper in
the jury room inscribed With twelve different amounts, the total
being divided by twelve, and the quotient agreeing with the verdict
is generally held not to raise a presumption of a prior agreement to
fix upon the amount of the verdict." The Virginia court has
6 Roy v. Goings, 112 I1. 656. (1885).
7 Vasie v. Delaval, 1 T. R. 11, K. B. (1785) ; Pickens v. Broom Co. 58 W. Va.
11, 50 S. E. 872, (1905).
8 Lowther v. Oil and Gas Co. 88 W. Va. 650, 108 S. E. 276 (1921) ; C. & 0. R. R. Co.
V. Patton, 9 W. Va. 649, (1876); Shepherd v. Lumber Co. 86 Ore. 652, 168 Pac.
601, (1917); Shelton v. R. Co. 255 Fed. 182, (1918).
Hoare v. Hudley, 49 Cal. 275, (1874).
10 Roy v. Goings, Supra.
n John Spry Lumber Co. v. Duggan, 80 Ill. App. 394, (1899) ; Driscoll v. Nelligan,
46 N. Y. App. Div. 324, 61 N. Y. S. 692, (1899). Contra, South R. Co. v. Williams,
113 Ala. 620, 21 So. 328, (1896).
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gone even further and refused to declare paper of this character
admissible.' 2 If such papers are inadmissible, and if the jurors
cannot testify to their own misconduct, they being the only ones,
presumptively, who know of misconduct of this character, it may
be asked what defence can be made for this rule.
This disability placed upon jurors by the common law, has
in some states been removed by statute, as for instance in South
Dakota."3 In Iowa it was held that under the statute the affidavits
of jurors may be admitted to show that the jury found a quotient
verdict. 4 Where an attorney, or one not a juror testifies that he
believed the jury to have found a quotient verdict, basing his belief
upon the finding of papers in the jury room, and his testimony
is not contradicted, the court granted a new trial.5 But a juror
in such case can deny that the verdict was so found, for while he
cannot testify to impeach his verdict based upon his misconduct,
he is at liberty to testify in support of it.' 6 In a recent Kansas
case the affidavits of jurors were admitted and a new trial was
granted on the ground that the affidavits showed the verdict to have
been found by the quotient method. 7 In Alabama an affidavit by
one of the jurors admitting a quotient verdict to have been found
was admitted.18 Where, in a Texas case there were conflicting
affidavits of jurors as to how the verdict was faunA, the court
after considering them all held that there had been no abuse of
discretion in granting a new trial;' " in accord wherewith is a
recent Washington decision. 20
West Virginia has adopted the general rule laid down in an early
Virginia case' that a juror's affidavit offered to impeach his
verdict is inadmissible, the court adding that there are no excep-
tions.22 But few cases have arisen in this jurisdiction involving
the question of quotient verdicts and in these cases the affidavits of
jurors impeaching such a verdict have been excluded.2  The value
of the rule is minimized by the difficulties attendant upon its
application.
-H. C. H.
32 Washington Park Co. v. Goodrich, 110 Va. 692, 66 S. D. 977, (1910).
N Murphy v. Murphy, 1 S. D. 316, 47 N. W. 142, (1890).
11 Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Ia. 379 (1867) ; Clary v. Blondel 178 Ia. 101
159 N. W. 604, (1916).
15 Hank v. Allen, (Ind.) 11 L. R. A. 706, (1890).
16 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, VoL. IV, § 2352; Okla. K. & M. I. Co. v. McGhee, (Okla.)
202 Pac. 277, (1922).
17 Anderson v. Kirby, 105 Kans. 596, 185 Pac. 894, (1919) ; Wichita v. Stallings,
59 Kans. 779, 54 Pac. 689, (1898).
Is Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bishop. (Ala.) 85 So. 859, (1920).
'9 Bryan & C. I. R. Co. v. Elleson, 241 S. W. 542, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
o Oliver v. Taylor, 205 Pac. 746, (Wash. 1922).
2 Bull v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. 613. and note., (1857).
SC. & 0. B. Co. v. Patton, 9 W. Va. 649, (1876).
2 C. & 0. R. Co. v. Patton; Lowther v. Oil and Gas Co., supra.
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